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3.3 The Southeast European States 
 




Bulgaria is a small country in the Eastern Balkans at the South-Eastern 
shore of the Black Sea. Its area is 108.560 square kilometers mixed terrain 
with fertile arable landscape in the North (Danube basin) and East, and 
mountainous terrain in the central and Western parts of the country (25% 
of the area, e.g. Rodope Mountains). Today the population of the country 
is 7.050 thousand inhabitants, down from its peak of almost 9 million in 
1987. The change of the population is due to declining birth rates and most 
importantly massive outmigration. Estimations state that some 1-1.2 
Million people moved from the country to other locations between 1990 
and 2005, mainly young active population. This process poses serious 
threats for the Bulgarian economy even in the short run. Concerning the 
process of aging, the statistical figures already show the negative 
consequences: the age cohort 65+ included 21.0% of total population in 
2018, meanwhile children (aged 15-18) accounted to only 14.2%. Largest 
cities were Sofia (1.236 thousand inhabitants), Plovdiv (343 thousand) and 
Varna (335 thousand). In total 74.67% of the population was urban (2017).  
1. Political context and quality of institutions 
Bulgaria has a rather turbulent history. The current country is the third 
Bulgarian state. Bulgarians lived several centuries long under Byzantine 
rule, then, after a brief period of independence under Ottoman rule. Both 
big empires left their legacy in the country. Therefore, the cultural, political 
and economic heritage of the country was fairly different from the 
“mainstream” Euro-Atlantic models (Djankov and Hauck 2016). Hence, 
the Bulgarian variant of the capitalist models is also very peculiar, it is a 
mixture of Western-type institutions in Eastern-type environment. This 
means that some of the standard Western institutions like property right 




Europe. This is also reflected in the various synthetic measures. Close ties, 
paternalism and cronyism marred this capitalist model. It is somewhere in 
between the Mediterranean and the Russian model, with much weaker state 
than in this later one. In fact, business-polity relationships have always 
been a problem area in the country, with corrupt business taking the lead 
over politics (Schoenman 2014). Corruption, organised crime, and the 
resulting state capture position (Hellman et al. 2000; Wedel 2001; Innes 
2013) are still very problematic, and the European Union keeps on 
controlling Bulgarian efforts at eliminating the issues in the country (Appel 
and Orenstein 2018). Some progress has been achieved, but the country is 
by far not free of the problem (Racovita 2011).  
Another important caveat of the historic development path is the area of 
human and social development. The mass scale migration out of Bulgaria 
is a very serious problem for the country (Krastev 2002), even if dissidents 
support their relatives through remittances that contribute to the stimulation 
of the economy. Yet, the steady decline of the active population has led to 
serious labour shortages, which is a primary impediment of future 
economic growth. The human endowment problem is exacerbated through 
the byzantine-type of society. Personal ambition, entrepreneurship but also 
the desire to be tapped in the most current updating of social and economic 
life is not strong enough in the country. Moreover, it is the more receptive 
young generation which moved abroad. Thus, the Bulgarian society is 
rather slow to join global modernisation tendencies. This is also clearly 
seen in the DESI (2018) figures. 
Bulgaria was rather underdeveloped country compared to other socialist 
countries before the transition process. Forced industrialisation created 
important metallurgical capacities and also some other manufacturing 
activities were launched (e.g. in machinery industry: fork lifts production, 
electrical industry: types of personal computers and radio transmission 
devices), but the bulk of the country’s industry was still specialised in 
garment and footwear, as well as food industries. All these industries 
became crisis industries already during the 1980s, before the transition 
process was started. Therefore, due to the lack of competitive activities 
quick liberalisation (70% of prices were liberalised in 1989) produced 
serious transformational recession in the country. This also created high 
inflation, that peaked by 330% in 1991 (Bitizenis 2003).  
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The Bulgarian governments could not avoid massive unemployment and 
impoverishment through other means than the subsidisation of loss-making 
industrial firms. The state-owned banks also continued lending and 
accumulated huge amounts of non-performing debt portfolio. This policy 
could not be maintained any longer than 1996/7, when the Bulgarian 
economy collapsed and inflation started to soar again (900%). The 
macroeconomic stability was restored with the introduction of currency 
board to stabilise the Bulgarian currency and tightening of the prudential 
regulations of commercial banks (Bitzenis 2003; Barlemann et al. 2002). 
The stabilisation program was also supported by the International 
Monetary Fund. IMF extended conditional loans to Bulgaria. Financial 
sector privatisation was to be accelerated (Pop-Eleches 2009). 
As far as privatisation policy is concerned, only slow efforts were made by 
the 1992 funded Privatisation Agency (PA) and the responsible branch 
ministries. The otherwise also rather unattractive Bulgarian firms were not 
foreseen to be sold on open tenders. PA rather wanted to consolidate them 
before deciding how to privatise. The consolidation of firms was not 
successful since economic policy did not have any credible device during 
the 1990s to enforce corporate restructuring. Instead, continuous 
subsidisation of the loss-making companies occurred with no serious 
restructuring efforts. When this expensive way of maintaining jobs could 
not be financed any more, firms went bankrupt on a mass scale in 1997. Up 
till then, practically only a kind of mass privatisation effort was effectively 
carried out in late 1995, but this action did not change the situation of the 
state sector (Bitzenis 2003).  
The development of the private sector did not root in privatisation but rather 
in misusing incompetent banks loose crediting activity. Inadequate levels 
of banking skills and loose prudential regulation topped by high level 
corruption enabled some Bulgarian would-be oligarchs to take huge loans 
under fraudulent conditions from the commercial banks. Similarly to the 
establishment of Russian oligarchy, many Bulgarian tycoons also started 
their capital accumulation process using illegal or at least fraudulent 
transactions. Although Bulgaria made some efforts to limit corruption and 
organised crime, and also to stabilise the economy, the most important 
measure of these efforts, the EU accession, was postponed to 2007 (Appel 
and Orenstein 2018). Even then Bulgaria had to set up appropriate agencies 




rights are still not well protected. The judiciary in Bulgaria’s “flawed 
democracy” relies on legal and institutional reforms demanded by the EU 
accession process, but effective gains in efficiency and accountability 
continue to be lacking (Krastev 2002). The court system is not trusted by 
citizens that gives rise to “alternative dispute management practices” and 
criminal activities. The government’s half-hearted efforts to combat 
corruption remained with moderate success. The policy of political 
conditionality pursued by the EU and the IMF negatively affected the 
governments’ domestic power base (Simmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005). 
Organised crime is heavily involved in human and narcotics trafficking and 
smuggling (Racovita 2011). 
World Bank (2018) governance indicators shows mixed development 
tendencies in the case of Bulgaria. The country could significantly improve 
its position in two important indicator groups between 2007-2018. In 
political stability and absence of violation its ranking increased from 56 to 
60. Government effectiveness improved even more significantly: from 54 
to 64. Regulatory quality improved from the relatively high 71st to 73rd 
position. The rule of law indicator and control of corruption remained 
unchanged (around 50). This is bad news, because these areas have always 
been important bottlenecks of Bulgarian development that was criticised 
by global institutions and the European Union as well. Unfortunately, the 
voice and accountability indicator declined from 68 to 59 after 2007. This 
means an important decline in the perceptions of the extent to which 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom expression, association, and a free media. 
2. General economic outlook 
The growth performance of the country has been rather whimsical. The 
World Bank (2017) database shows that during the transformational crisis 
that started in 1989 and lasted until 1993, GDP declined by over 25.6% 
only to recover rather slightly between 1993-1998 by 10%, when the 
Russian currency crisis pushed back the economy again by 8% (EBRD 
2000). The early 2000s showed rather vivid economic growth with 4-7% 
annual rates, thus by the year of the country’s accession to the European 
Union (2007) economy finally recovered to the pre-transition level of 
output. The 2008 global financial crisis hit the Bulgarian economy again 
producing 3.6% decline, which was then recovered in the following two 
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years. The Bulgarian economy showed more stable and significant growth 
in the years 2015-18 with rates between 3-4%. The 10 year average growth 
rate was 1.9% in 2018. GDP per capita at purchasing power parity was 49% 
of the EU average in 2017, up from 37% in 2006. Taking into account the 
relatively modest GDP growth performance of the country, the increase 
could be traced back to the massive decline of the denominator (declining 
population).  
 
GDP of Bulgaria (BGN Million, constant prices). 
 
 






Per Capita GDP in USD, PPP (1990-2018). 
 
Bulgaria used to be a mostly agrarian land. As a member of the Soviet bloc, 
forced industrialisation took place also in this country producing important 
facilities in mining and metallurgy, engineering and food industry. Much 
of the heavy industry collapsed during the years of transformational 
recession. Instead services gained importance also through the entry of 
multinational firms in trade, telecommunication and banking. Agricultural 
employment still maintained much importance employing 17.7% of the 
total labour force in 2018. Industrial employment remained relatively stable 
with 25.4% (manufacturing 19.6%). Services (including community 
services) employed 56.9%.  
Fiscal and monetary stability have not always been primary targets of 
economic policy in Bulgaria. The governments during the 1990s repeatedly 
accumulated high state debt in their fruitless effort to consolidate ailing big 
business and loss-making banks. Instead of tightening fiscal discipline, 
paternalistic linkages have survived in a new political manner. This conflict 
avoiding behaviour and the accumulated high debt and hyperinflation of 
course strongly limited the country’s chances to successfully complete the 
EU accession requirements. In fact, accession occurred without the full 
implementation of the acquis (Racovita 2011). The systemic weaknesses 
of the country required continuous monitoring, especially in the field of 
corruption and organised crime. Fiscal stability, on the other hand, was 
successfully restored and maintained throughout the 2010s.  
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Fiscal discipline of Bulgaria is clearly shown by the country’s most recent 
macroeconomic data. In 2017, Bulgaria run fiscal sufficit (+1.1%), and the 
debt burden was also well beyond the Maastricht criteria representing 
25.6% of the GDP. With these figures Bulgaria has become one of the 
macroeconomically most stable countries of the European Union. As it was 
already shown by the relatively low social expenditure, Bulgaria 
moderately centralises the spending of GDP, and state redistribution is not 
particularly high. Total government expenditure was 35.1% in 2017. Not 
surprisingly, inflation was also very low in the same year: 1.2%. 
Bulgarian social protection system is built up in line with the acquis of the 
European Union. Fine tuning of the systems may of course create 
substantial differences in many aspects. The rather generous Scandinavian 
model being an extreme and the rather self-reliant Anglo-Saxon model 
being the other. The Bulgarian system is only moderately generous. This 
may also be a consequence of more cautious fiscal policy after having 
learnt the lesson of excessive paternalism during the 1990s. In 2017, the 
level of total benefits was 11.3% of the GDP. The total government 
expenditure directed to families as a share of total government expenditure 
was only 5.8%. Pension expenditure reached 8.6% (2015) and the 
government spent 8.2% of the GDP on health care in the same year. 
Inequality in Bulgaria is fairly high, higher than in other countries in the 
region. The Gini coefficient on incomes was 43.4 in 2018. After corrections 
with social transfers it declined to 40.2. This means that social solidarity 
cannot significantly improve living conditions of the poor. 
3. Quality of entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship has little tradition in Bulgaria. Traditionally, in this 
mostly agrarian land much of the economic activity has been carried out in 
families or in unincorporated small business. Also, the centuries long 
foreign dominance discouraged Bulgarian citizens to launch business 
ventures. After the 1990 transition this situation changed and 
entrepreneurship was encouraged. However, high level of criminalisation 
paralysed business development also in this more recent period. Therefore, 




criminalisation has affected government activities also very badly. All this 
is reflected by the entrepreneurship surveys. 
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor’s spider shows adequate levels of 
physical infrastructure in the country. Unfortunately, this is the only 
measure where Bulgaria got a 4 score. Nevertheless, the country exceeded 
the regional average levels with scores around 3 in three aspects: 
entrepreneurial finance, taxes and bureaucracy (government policies) and 
commercial and legal infrastructure. Bulgaria lagged behind the regional 
average of the entrepreneurial framework conditions with regards to 
internal market dynamics, entrepreneurial education at post school age and 
also school age, government entrepreneurship programs and internal 
market burdens, entry regulations. These factors reflect handicaps in social 
institution systems (education and business support). All these barriers 
contribute to the very low level (2) of support, and relevance measure of 
government policies, as well as the similarly underdeveloped cultural and 
social norms. In all these aspects Bulgaria naturally also lags behind the 
regional average. Inadequate business support by social institutions and 
government policies, as well as low level of STI system both determine a 
rather low profile development path for the country. 
The 2018 edition of WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report evaluated 
Bulgaria to rank 51 out of 140 countries worldwide. This is a very 
impressive improvement from the 2009 low of ranking 76. The 
improvement was mainly achieved in the area of institutions (from rank 
116 to 70, and infrastructure from rank 102 to 58). The country’s overall 
performance became more balanced scoring in the range 30 to 70 (mostly 
around 50) in the various competitiveness pillars. Bulgaria lags behind the 
Europe-North America average most significantly still in the area of 
institutions, moreover in ICT adaptation, health, product market, financial 
system, business dynamism and innovation capacity; the main drivers of 
business dynamism.  A closer look at the components of the individual 
pillars shows however, that the country has clear advantages in some fields 
and long lasting problems in some others. Efficiency of legal framework in 
challenging regulations (rank 134), conflict of interest regulation (121), 
property right enforcement (108), and judicial independence (103) show 
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serious weaknesses of market economic institutions, especially in the area 
of property rights and social control over public regulations. Another 
problem area is human skills and education. Ease of finding skilled 
employees is especially low ranked (138). This is due not only to the 
relatively modest level of education but even more importantly intensive 
outmigration. Most of the estimated 1-1.2 million migrants are young 
active adults. As mentioned, the cultural heritage is not favourable for 
entrepreneurship. Attitudes toward entrepreneurial risk (134), low level of 
internal labour mobility (136), as well as diversity of workforce (139) all 
show low level of incentives to take risks, which may be to some extent a 
general phenomenon in East-Central Europe. 
An important feature of the social heritage in Bulgaria is risk aversion. This 
is also reflected in relatively low acceptance of competition. Therefore, on 
the one hand the Bulgarian firms have difficulties with competition, and 
they will rather settle market conflicts than fight back. The low interest in 
business participation is reflected by the relatively low number of SMEs 
per 1000 inhabitants (336). The OECD’s product market regulation 
measure (2013) was 1.57 in 2013 (the only figure provided for the non-
member country) that is somewhat higher than the  OECD average. More 
developed countries’ figures were in the range of 1.2-1.4. Barriers to entry 
related to administration is regarded high in the Institutional Profile 
Database (ranked 3). This gives an impression of having significant 
bureaucratic corruption in the country. The share of large scale distribution 
in the retail sector is also evaluated relatively high, meanwhile the role of 
foreign firms in this was most significant (4). Large national firms role is 
negligible or non-existent. Practices of competitors have moderate impact, 
competition regulation is not very strong. 
The 2019 Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom ranking placed 
Bulgaria 37th with 69 points to the top of the moderately free countries 
(before other East-Central European countries). The country improved 
performance in monetary freedom, and fiscal health. The Foundation 
appreciated Bulgarian efforts at the improvement of free market conditions: 
“The institutional and structural reform process, although somewhat 




the transition from the centralised, planned economy to a more liberal, 
market-driven one. Reforms include privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises, adoption of favourable investment regime, liberalisation of 
trade, and strengthening of the tax system. Public debt has been well 
managed. However, corruption in public administration, a weak judiciary, 
low productivity, and organised crime continue to hamper Bulgaria’s 
investment climate and economic prospects”. Weak points are still property 
rights enforcement, government integrity and judicial effectiveness. The 
measure intensity of local competition in the 2017 Global Competitiveness 
Report was 4.8 or 91st position, which is well below the average. The 
number of newly registered firms per 1000 active persons was 10.69 in 
2016. 
4. Modernisation based on FDI 
Bulgaria has never been a primary target of foreign direct investments. Its 
accumulated FDI stock is rather modest. The country followed cautious 
privatisation policy and did not sell big business and major banks to foreign 
investors. The Bulgarian governments maintained the subsidisation of loss-
making firms rather in the hope that they would sooner or later consolidate 
their activity. In most of the cases this did not happen. The continuous 
financial unattractiveness of Bulgarian big business and the expiration of 
first movers’ advantage (massive investment in other countries of the 
region) dramatically reduced Bulgaria’s attractiveness as an FDI target 
country. Mostly market seeking investment projects were carried out in 
trade, communication banking and other services. The main investors were 
Greek and Turkish companies. The fairly weak FDI activity and the weak 
industrial potential delivers the message that FDI did not contribute to a 
massive restructuring and modernisation of the country. Unfortunately, no 
other (internal) sources were found to do this job. Therefore, the lack of 
modernisation investments in value adding activities limited the 
development potential of the economy.  
The banking sector became dominated by foreign firms after the 
consolidation and sale of bankrupted state-owned banks in the late 1990s. 
By the year 2000, foreign share reached 74%. After some further increase 
it remained at 66% level by the year 2012. Parallel with this process the 
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role of state ownership was reduced from 70% in 1995 to 3% in 2010. 
Among the 500 largest companies of the CEE region only 10 operated in 
Bulgaria. This low figure also shows the relative underdevelopment of the 
country with very modest activity of big business. Out of this rather small 
stock there were 2 state-owned, 3 multinational companies (not from CEE), 
two multinationals from CEE countries, and 3 local companies. Clearly, 
there are not many foreign firms in Bulgaria, but the country also lacks 
sizeable local companies. The total inward stock of FDI in Bulgaria was 
47.838 million of USD in 2017, up from only 2.704 USD in 2000. Total 
outward FDI stock of Bulgaria was 2.817 million USD in 2017 (UNCTAD 
2018). 
Investment in general remained moderate with 18.5% of the GDP in 2018, 
while the European average was 20.5%. Sluggish investment activity does 
not provide strong thrust to modernisation and reconstruction of the 
Bulgarian economy. Bulgaria runs a trade surplus and has therefore a 
higher share of exports in percentage of the GDP than imports. The 67.4% 
of exports and 63.7% of imports represents moderate openness. It reflects 
the importance of the production of basic commodities consumed 
domestically (high share of agriculture in the GDP). Also, the role of 
multinational companies’ GVCs is less developed than in the Visegrad 
countries, let alone core Europe. Domestic consumption has an important 
role, therefore Bulgaria is perhaps less dependent on its foreign trade 
performance than the Visegrad countries. 
Labour market processes in Bulgaria are determined by declining labour 
supply. Both quantitatively and qualitatively seen, Bulgarian labour market 
is shrinking due to massive migration. Excess demand and relatively weak 
regulation (higher flexibility) are the two important features. Due to the 
lack of larger scale industrial investments productivity has not increased 
sufficiently, therefore incomes have not yet increase significantly despite 
of the labour shortage. The share of wages in total GDP was 36.7% in 2017, 
total compensations of employees plus employers’ social contributions – 
49.5%. Trade unions played marginal role in Bulgaria. The trade union 
density rate was 18% in 2012. Due to labour market flexibility and also the 




participation rate to relatively high 71.3% level (2017). It is not surprising 
under the given labour market circumstances that unemployment is low 
with 5.2% in 2018. This is a fairly low rate especially in comparison with 
the years 2010-2014, when it was double digit peaking in 2013 with 13%. 
Collective bargaining affects 29% of the employees, somewhat higher that 
the trade union rate, most probably because collective bargaining in the 
public sector with only 3.8% temporary employees rate is rather negligible. 
Most probably temporary employment is badly recorded thus contributing 
to the grey economy. Labour productivity increased by 22.9% in the period 
2010-2018, very significant increase, third after Romania and Poland in the 
European Union. Estimations of migration vary between 1 and 1.2 million 
people, mostly active persons, roughly 25-30% of total active population, 
which constitutes a tremendous loss to the Bulgarian economy. 
5. Knowledge sector 
 
In the traditional Euro-Atlantic capitalist model innovation is a main driver 
of economic development. In the Byzantine heritage of Bulgaria this driver 
has always been very weak. Therefore, Bulgaria is a moderately innovating 
country with fairly weak traditions in its STI system. Historic tradition of 
being part of the Ottoman empire did not create strong social institutions, 
and the Bulgarian governments had to make rather serious efforts to create 
a modern school system. Government efforts to improve education are still 
relatively strong. The government expenditure on education was 11.44% 
of the GDP (2013), a fairly high share in the region. Higher education rate 
was even more impressive with 36.4%. These figures of course do not tell 
much about the quality of education but we can expect that it is not better 
or worse than in other countries in the region, and then the high share of 
higher education enrolment could be an advantage of the country. The other 
sub-system of the STI sector, innovation, on the other hand is still very 
weak. Total R& D expenditure as percentage of the GDP was merely 0.78% 
in 2016. Very clearly, there is not much private (corporate) spending, and 
also state spending is inadequate. Bulgarian plans to increase this share to 
1.5% do not seem very ambitious but given the fact that the country lacks 
appropriate big business this ambition still seems unrealistic. The relative 
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weakness of big business is also reflected in the modest share of high tech 
products in total exports, which was 7.44% in 2017. 
Economic growth and prosperity is fuelled in the long run through 
technological development and innovations. The role of STI is far reaching 
and is not restricted to the application of modern products and technologies 
in the factories. It crucially determines also entrepreneurship and the level 
of usage of new technologies (productivity). Therefore, an adequate 
development level of the national innovation system can strongly support 
long term development of the economy and society. Unfortunately, 
Bulgaria seems to lag behind the European average in this regard. The 27 
STI measures used by the European Innovation Scoreboard clearly reflect 
this situation. Bulgaria is modest innovator: only 27th among the EU 
member states. R&D expenditure was only 0.63% of the GDP in 2013. 
Both public and private spending on R&D is very low. The summary 
innovation index deteriorated between 2010 and 2017. This was mainly due 
to massive declines in the fields of finance and support, firm investments, 
SME innovation outputs, linkage development and the sales impact of 
knowledge intensive and high-tech products. Some improvement was 
achieved in intellectual assets and broadband penetration. Bulgaria seems 
to lack important institutional legs of innovation in the area of higher 
education and industry. 
Bulgaria scores rather weak in the European Union’s Digital Economy and 
Society Index as well. The country was 26th in 2018. The DESI country 
profile reported only slight improvements over the year 2017. The country 
lags behind the EU average in all of the covered aspects. It is relatively 
closest to the average with 35% level in the field of connectivity and digital 
public services. The use of internet services is still somewhat over 30%. 
Worse is the country’s situation in human capital (enabling knowledge), 
and the integration of digital technology. The overall DESI indicator shows 
an increasing gap with the EU28 average. A few areas where Bulgaria was 
closest to the EU average were mobile broadband takeup, video calls 
(perhaps because of the large number of dissidents), and social networks. 
Significant improvements were reported in the area of digital public 






6. Public opinion attitude towards transformations 
The EU accession process has always been a political issue. This is clearly 
seen in most enlargement programs. The accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania was not an exception either. The European Union admitted two 
relatively poor new member countries that did not belong to the Euro-
Atlantic historical and cultural heritage, and could not transform their 
societies to that pattern even after several years of accession. This is clearly 
seen in their continuous fight with corruption and crime, very low level of 
legal security especially in the field of property right enforcement, the 
survival of the traditional crony ties between business and polity. In 
Bulgaria these linkages are controlled by the private business, the state is 
captured. This model lacks the adequate drivers for economic development. 
No ambition is present to excel with entrepreneurship. Career opportunities 
in competitive business are rather limited since property right enforcement 
is loose, the judiciary is weak and not independent. Also high level of 
corruption thwarts business development. These conditions together with 
economic policy mistakes reduced the growth potential of the country. 
Therefore it could not narrow its development gap with more developed 
member states of the EU. This is the main reason of very large scale 
outmigration, a process that deprives the Bulgarian economy form vital 
human resources for future development as well. 
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Dissatisfaction with the economy is very strong (72% in 2018 according to 
Eurobarometer 90). Economic problems are in the foreground of citizens’ 
concerns: inflation/cost of living 48%, health and social security 32%, 
general economic situation 26%. Concerning European problems Bulgaria 
too sees immigration and terrorism more serious than the European 
average, maybe also because the country is heavily involved in smuggling. 
The general public clearly sees the weakness of the governments and an 
outstanding high share of the population does not trust the government 
(67%). In contrast, most people still support the European Union (53%). 
Public support declined from 63% in 2004 (Eurobarometer 62).   
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